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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the current Internal Control System (ICS) implemented by the Regency Governments (RG) in Kupang 
District and North Central Timor (TTU) District using the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) framework. This research was developed in two phases. The first phase started with the interview of 100 
officials out of 300 top officials in the two RGs to assess which control components were the worst implemented in their 
current ICS. Applying SERVQUAL model as the research technique, it revealed that the control environment demonstrated the 
worst implementation in two districts and this was mainly driven by a lack of commitment of top officials to strengthen ICS. In 
the second part, this research determined what factors may influence top officials to be less committed to strengthening ICS. 
Based on a number of organizational theories, this study found that the most significant factor induces top officials’ having 
poor commitment is conflict of interest. The study also found that social conflict of interest was the most commonly triggered 
reason driving top official to be less committed in RG in Kupang District, while in TTU District, political conflict of interest 
was the major reason affecting the top officials having less commitment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since its implementation in 1999, fiscal decentralization (FD) has not been successfully implemented in 
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Indonesia. This is because of poor ICS implementation in local governments (Stated Audit Agency of Indonesia, 
2011). The lack of effective ICS contributes to fraud and lowers corruption detection and prevention systems 
which is a major snag in improving local accountability in Indonesia (World Bank, 2003). Evidence shows that the 
control issue still does not gain recognition as a critical issue within fiscal decentralization application despite 
higher rates of corruption at local levels in Indonesia (Rinaldi, 2007, Bambang 2003).  
To solve the issue the central government established a Government Regulation number 60 in 2008 to promote 
ICS model adopted from COSO Model which comprises of five interrelated components, namely: control 
environment, risk management, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring. This model is 
regarded as the best solution to strengthen ICS at local levels; nevertheless the implementation of this model is still 
weak. In fact, , there were 176 corruption cases between 2004 and 2012 involving top officials at local levels in 
Indonesia and 90 percent of the cases were related to internal control cases (Indonesian Eradication Corruption 
Commission-IECC, 2012). Moreover, ineffective ICS is commonly demonstrated in poor control environment 
which affects poor Public Financial Management (PFM), resulting in a higher numbers of corruption cases in local 
governments programs (SAA Audit Report, 2009-2012). 
Another study revealed that that the poor ICS implementation was attributed to low awareness amongst local 
level officials of the importance of ICS - in FD, which was evident in poor commitment of the officials to 
strengthen the control environment (Kawedar, 2010) and further consequence of ineffective control environment 
which the critical foundation of ICS, is other ICS components are automatically ineffective. This is shown in poor 
institutional arrangements for financial accountability, resulting in the higher number of control issues such as 
frauds, irregularities, lack of compliance with regulations, and the inability of local governments to produce timely 
accurate financial information (Zumriyatun, 2010;World Bank, 2004d; Commission on Audit, 2003).  
SAA diagnostic study (2012) reported that out of 32 provinces in Indonesia, local governments in East Nusa 
Tenggara (ENT) province have performed the worst ICS, leading to poor PFM and low audit opinion obtained. In 
fact, during 2009-2011, more than 70% of Local Governments Financial Reports (LGFRs) of 22 LGFRs in ENT, 
got disclaimer prompted by the higher number of control cases. In addition, among 22 LGFRs, Kupang District 
and TTU District LGFR reported the highest control cases related to cases in accounting system, planning and 
budgeting system and internal control structure (SAA Audit Report, 2009-2012).  
For example, TTU Regency Government (RG) presented an unreliable number of fixed assets of 9 million 
dollar in LGFR 2009.  In fact, the number of the asset was not capitalized, the number of the assets was different 
with the source documents, and the number of the assets was not physically recalculated, hence there was a 
discrepancy between the number on Balance Sheet and physical number (SAA Audit Report, 2009-2012).  This 
indicates poor accounting system and reporting, stemming from lack of commitment of top official to set 
transparency, accountability and reliability in the control environment of accounting process.  
The pictures above depict, the ICS implementation is far from effective ICS. Effective ICS is an effective of 
internal administrative and financial checks and balances designed by management, and supported by corrective 
actions, to ensure that the goals and responsibilities of the organization are achieved (Candreva, 2006) and this has 
been exercised effectively by United Stated of America (USA) Local Governments in managing their FD programs 
by effectively bolstering ICS control environment then is followed by develop other components’ system. Even 
though, it has been centuries to build the effective ICS, but finally it easily guides their local public organization 
towards achieving governments’ objectives in operational efficiency and effectiveness, reliability of financial 
reporting, and acquiescence (World Bank, 2003).  
The studies above provide critical concepts for this research foundation i.e. the lack of effective ICS can be a 
major obstacle for the local levels in the FD application, conveying in ineffective ICS and resulting in poor PFM 
and higher number of control cases which is one of them is corruption. In addition, generally, the main reason of 
poor ICS is because of weak control environment which is actually the foundation of other control components 
(COSO, 1992) and this stems from lack of top officials’ commitment.   
To analyse ICS implementation in RG of Kupang District and TTU District, there were 100 top officials out of 
300 top officials of two RGs interviewed. The emphasize is more on top officials because the tops have the most 
powerful influence to set organizational culture that greatly affects the effectiveness control environment and 
overall ICS (Drucker, 1988, Maciariolle, 1984). Next, top officials play  more important roles in FD 
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implementation i.e. deciding how resources are used, and to some extends this situation persuades top officials 
engaging with “conflict of interest”, causing them to be uncommitted in creating effective ICS (Manor, 1999; 
Finance Ministry, 2011). In fact, there were 176 corruption cases involved local level tops in Indonesia during 
2004-2012 and 90% of the cases related to internal control cases.  
 This research was designed into two steps. The first step determined the ICS components that have been most 
poorly implemented by assessing the respondents’ answers using the SERVQUAL model. It discovered that the 
control environment component was the worst implemented in two districts and this was mainly driven by lack of 
commitment of top officials to strengthen ICS because of conflict of interest that is the officials as the agent allows 
their private interests and affiliations to compromise public needs or the principal needs (Ritzer & Goodman 
2004).  
 Further step ascertained what factors may affect top officials to be poorly committed by conducting a survey 
consisting of conflict of interest factors related to political, economic and social aspects with relevant determinants 
applied in developing countries, in particular Kupang District and TTU District. In fact, in political aspect is more 
determined by a political pressure from national political elites into the top local officials to compromise citizens’ 
needs into political elites needs which almost occurs in most planning and budgeting process. Economic 
determinant is more driven by the level of salary, bonuses and appreciation. Finally, the determinant of social 
aspect is premodeliasm as the high diversity of tribe, religion, and race.  
Top officials tend to break their commitment when there are pressures by local and national political elites to 
compromises citizens needs into political elites needs by manipulating budget items to fund political activities, 
rather than fulfilling public needs (Devas, 2005). Pioneering expenditure tracking studies in the early 1990s cited 
by Devas (2005) found that, on average in developing countries, less than 20% of primary education capitation 
grants were reaching schools. The rest was being captured by local officials and politicians, either to fund other 
activities or for personal gain. .  
Further aspect is in economic interests due to low salary level or unsatisfied reward. This is highly likely 
promoting corrupt or simply dysfunctional employees because they are preoccupied with searching for other 
income opportunities. Another determinant of economic interest is unsystematic bonuses system, demonstrating in 
diligent and lazy official have the same bonuses rates because of the lack of performance based management 
(Dalton & Lawence, 1971).  
The next aspect which is socially contributed to conflict of interest is premodealism which is considered as a 
perceived need to surrender certain powers to one person who has an authority, as a way of holding their ethnically 
fragmented nations together. This has a great effect on the implementation of decentralization. It is argued that 
people from the same ethnic tend to be more grouping themselves, thinking that they have the same culture and 
customs. This emotional attachment can lead to conflict of interest when one party tries to help others from the 
same ethnic while at the same time compromising public’s needs (Manor, 1999).  
The three aspects explained are potentially influence the tops to break their commitment because of conflict of 
interest which when it is taking place, automatically, they are failing to perform their duty as committed agents 
who are expected by the principal i.e. the Citizens, to perform their duties with integrity, in a fair and unbiased way 
(Ritzer & Goodman 2004).  
Based on above studies the second step was developed and it revealed that the reason causes conflict of interest 
in top official level in Kupang District is more driven by social aspect which is triggered by premodeliasm, while 
in TTU District is more determined by political factors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the research problem was studied, 
including detailed information about the research variables, the sample selection, and equipment and materials 
used. Section 3 presents the main findings, the highlighted findings and result of SERVQUAL and Likert Scale. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical findings, and Section 5 presents the conclusions and recommendation 
 
2. Methods 
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2.1 Step One-Analysing Existing ICS  
 
2.1.1 The Respondents and the Research Variables  
 
The research period of ICS implementation was during 2009-2011 which was audited by SAA in 2010-2012. 
The 2009-2011 periods were chosen because the periods are the elected regent working period, in both districts. 
There were 50 top officials of each RG were randomly selected as the respondents. Top officials were preferred 
because they have significant power to manage ICS since they have the power to establish a control environment 
which is the basic foundation to implement ICS. Top official in this research is those who are at the top level of 
two RGs and at the top level of Local Government Administration Department (LGAD). Indeed, they show the 
leading path to reach organization goals, once they make mistakes in creating good governance, entirely 
organization will be badly affected (Drucker, 1988, Maciariello, 1984). 
COSO Model adopted in Government Regulation (GR) number 60 in 2008 to manage Public ICS in Indonesia 
is used to analyse current ICS in the two districts. According to the GR, ICS is a process that guides an 
organization towards achieving its objectives which contains of five interrelated components. The first component 
is the Control Environment that sets the tone for the organization established by top management and provides the 
foundation for all other components of internal control which includes integrity, ethical values and the competence 
of the people. The ICS is well applied or not, depends on how the top management established the rules and highly 
committed to enforce the control rules (Drucker, 1988). The most important thing is the top officials demonstrate a 
role model showing integrity, ethical values and loyalty. 
The second component is Risk Assessment that identifies and analyses of relevant risks, internal and external to 
the achievement of the objectives, forming a basis for determining how the risks should be managed. The third 
component is Control Activities that ensure necessary actions are taken to address risks relating to the achievement 
of the entity’s objectives. The next component is Information and Communication that identifies, captures, and 
communicates internal and external information in a form and timeframe that enable people to carry out their 
responsibilities. The fifth is monitoring, that is a process to assess the quality of the control system’s performance 
over time. This is accomplished through ongoing monitoring activities, separate evaluations or a combination of 
the two. Each component has its own determinants which are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The Description of ICS Components  
ICS 
Components 
The Components' 
Determinants 
The Determinants' Variables 
Control 
Environment 
Integrity and Ethics Number of behavioural rule 
Effective behavioural rule socialization 
Top officials' exemplary behaviour (being a role model) 
Staff awareness of the importance of integrity and ethics 
Rule enforcement 
Commitment Effective and efficient governance 
Number of work standard to evaluate working output 
Self enforcement to follow the working standard 
Staff enforcement to follow working standard 
Putting the right man at the right place 
Having a professional human resource database 
Utilizing the potential human resource 
Enforcement for human resourcing planning 
Number of key performance indicators for each activity 
The level of self managerial skills 
Conducive Leadership Considering risk management in each managerial decision 
Effective performance based management 
Committed to support a particular function to have effective ICS implementation 
The enforcement to protect asset and information  
Intensive interaction with lower officials 
Positively responsive on every report regarding finance, budgeting, program and activities 
Less staff transfers especially at program and operational activities, finance and auditing 
Organization Structure Effective organization structure based on the organization size and characteristic of 
organization activities 
Clearly stating staff job description and responsibilities 
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ICS 
Components 
The Components' 
Determinants 
The Determinants' Variables 
Clearly stating the connection and relationship of reporting stages 
Evaluating and adjusting organization structure periodically 
Ability to decide numbers of officials fitting with the number of job function 
Task and responsibilities 
delegation 
Putting the right task and responsibilities at the right staff 
Ensuring that staff knows the tasks and responsibilities 
Staff awareness of the link between conducting its works and ICS implementation 
Human Resource  Policy 
and Practice 
clearly set up policy and procedures of from staff recruitment to pension or discharging 
Always conducting an examination of candidate employees background at recruitment 
stage 
Periodically supervising staff performance 
Risk 
Management 
Establishing the 
organization goals 
Organization goals based on government regulation 
Effectively communicate the goals to the staff 
Ensuring that everyone knows the goals 
The consistency of operational strategy and central government strategic planning and 
risk assessment 
Highly integrated process between strategic planning and risk assessment 
Establishing activities' 
objectives 
Consistent with organization goals and strategic planning 
Each activity' goal is integrated with other activities goals 
Each activity's goal is relevant with main activity 
Each activity has key performance indicators 
It is supported with sufficient resources 
top officials commitment to support the achievement  
Risk Identification applying a comprehensive risk methodology identification 
External and internal risks are assessed with sufficient mechanism 
Other factors influencing the goals achievement have been critically assessed 
Risk Analyses Having a comprehensive risk assessment to analyse risk impacts on the goals achievement 
process 
Having a comprehensive risk management  
Control 
activities 
Unit government 
performance assessment 
Effective management review on top officials' activities 
Effective management review on each official at each activity 
Human Resource 
Development 
Effectively communicate the government strategic planning to all staff 
Comprehensive human resource development planning 
Comprehensive human resource strategic planning 
Number of selection criteria for each job position 
Effective management based performance 
Sufficient reward and appreciation to promote motivation 
Monitoring system on 
Information System 
Effective procedure protection on information system (IS) 
Skilful IS teamwork for IS protection 
Structurally classified resources needed for IS protection based on the importance and 
sensitivity 
Resource owners have identified users who have rights and authorization on IS formally 
Effective controlling procedure on application control 
Effective procedure to control document completeness 
Effective procedure to control accuracy 
Effective procedure to control reliability processing and data files 
Physical control of Assets Effective communication on asset protection procedures with all employees 
Comprehensive procedure for disaster recovery plan 
Determination and review 
of performance indicators 
Periodically reviewing employees performance at all levels 
Performance achievement is effectively evaluated  
Separation Function Top officials periodically have ensuring that all the main aspects of transactions is not 
controlled by one person 
Accuracy and relevancy 
of transaction record 
Transaction of and events are classified properly and promptly in transaction record 
Classification and recording have been applied on entire cycle of transaction 
Accountability of 
resources and records 
Top officials have appointed a person responsible over resources and records 
Top officials regularly control the assignments given 
Documentation Effective procedure for document protection 
Regularly top officials control the document protection process 
Information and 
Communication 
Information The level of top officials openness on internal and external information 
A procedure to recheck the information in order to provide effective feedback 
Communication Have established an effective internal communication 
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ICS 
Components 
The Components' 
Determinants 
The Determinants' Variables 
Have established an effective external communication, especially regarding the 
implementation of program, budgeting and funding 
Type and method of 
communication 
Effectively utilizing communication method and type 
Top officials periodically develop and update IS to maximize it function on 
communication process 
Top official shows their commitment on IS development by providing sufficient resources 
Monitoring Continuously monitoring Having established strategic planning for continuous monitoring 
in routine activities, employees have been effectively informed about effective or 
ineffective of existing ICS 
Having established an independent organizational structure and supervision to oversee 
ICS implementation 
Periodically comparing the financial records and physical check for effective 
reconciliation 
Top officials regularly follow up the recommendations for internal and external auditors 
Top officials regularly set up meeting with employees to gather information about the 
effectiveness of current ICS 
Separated evaluation Having established effective procedure for separated evaluation 
Using a proper methodology for separated evaluation 
The level of independency of supervision apparatus 
Effective follow up on the separated evaluation findings 
Audit Settlement Having established a clear procedure of audit follow up and feedback 
level of top officials responsiveness on audit findings 
level of top officials assertiveness on following up the findings 
 
2.1.2 Data collection technique and research technique 
 
Primary and secondary data were used in this research. The primary data was obtained from in depth-interview 
and FGD processes which consisted of questions regarding five components in ICS. The data was tabulated using 
the SERVQUAL model to obtain which component was the poorest in the current ICS implementation.  
The SERVQUAL model is the relevant technique in this research because the nature of this model is almost the 
same as the nature of this research. This model can draw the comparison of top officials’ expectation of ICS 
elaborating with ICS theories and the top officials’ perception of ICS implementation (Chingang, 2010). This 
model also offers flexibility regarding changing the original variables into ICS components.  Therefore, instead of 
presenting the scale of service variables of Tangibles, Reliability, Responsiveness, Assurance, and Empathy, the 
developed model consists of ICS components which are control environment, risk management, control activities, 
information and communication, and monitoring.  
The expectation score for each component is control environment 30%, risk management and control activities 
20% for each, information and communication and monitoring 15% for each. This score was determined by 
combining top officials’ expectation, ducker and Maciariello theories and SAA and ECC diagnostic study reports. 
In fact, control environment has the highest score expectation because it is the foundation in creating effective ICS. 
In addition, the SERVQUAL result was analysed and compared with the secondary data. The secondary data 
consisted of LGFRs 2009-2011, Audit Report from SAA 2010-2012, Accountability Report 2009-2011. After this 
step, the result was confirmed to the respondents using FGD technique. The reason of combining one-to-one 
interview and FGD is to reduce biases in order to have valid results. Indeed, one-to one interview offers in depth 
information, but can be judgmental. The answer of the interview then confirm through FGD as FGD offers more 
high validity (Krueger, 1988). Finally, the result was summarised to conclude the main findings of current 
implementation of ICS in two districts. 
 
2.2. Step two-determining the triggered point, causing ineffective ICS 
 
FGD method was still used to determine the triggered point of ineffective ICS. This step can only be designed 
after step one has been done, because each variable has different determinant. In this case, it was found that the 
commitment, which is one of the important determinants of control environment, is the most poorly implemented. 
Furthermore, a study was developed to find out the most factor which affects top official being uncommitted, in 
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particular occurred in fiscal decentralization implementation in developing countries. In fact, the literatures 
provide the argument that it is because of conflict of interest which is more related to political conflict of interest, 
economic interest and social interest (Manor, 1999; Devas, 2005; Kawedar, 2010; Zumriyatun, 2010). This 
argument, then, was critically discussed with top officials using FGD technique. 
Likert Scale was used as a research technique to decide out of three aspects’ variables which aspect is more 
controlled the officials to break their commitment according to respondents. Respondents were asked to rank their 
opinion on what level the variable has an effect on the top commitment, the levels are: very high (5), High (4), 
neutral (3), Low (2) or Very low (1). The variables of three aspects are presented in table 2.  
 
Table 2. The Driven Variables of Politic, Economy and Social Conflict of Interest 
The Aspect The Variables of the Aspect 
Politics The impacts of the country's next local, state, or national election on the change of government or regional policy? 
The effect of the most likely contenders for power viewing government policies on regent governance policies 
The effect of the most likely contenders for power viewing government budgeting, programs and activities 
The impact of change in government regulation, along with any planned changes to it, on regency governance 
The effect of budgeting timescale on proposed regency budgeting 
Economy The impact of current economy stability on government budgeting 
The impact of staff salary on performance 
Social The impact of change in society's levels of health, education, and social mobility on staff or top official life style 
The effect of diversity on religion, beliefs, tribes, races and social groups on social attitudes in working place 
 
The Likert scale is used to measure which variable has the highest impact because it is relevant in the case of 
study because it helps the researcher to measure opinions of the respondents (Web centre for Social Research, 
2013). Overall, it can determine out of 9above, which of the above factor are highly likely to occur in the 
governance practices in two districts. 
 
3. Result 
 
3.1 Step one-information to support current ICS assessment 
 
Following Tables were determined through one-to one interview and the results were tabulated using 
SERVQUAL Model. Then, the results were studied with secondary data and reconfirmed with the respondents 
through FGD to justify the findings and decide how many components categorised as the worst components. It 
found that the worst implemented components which were control environment, risk management and controlling 
activities components. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Figure 1. Current ICS Assessment-TTU District                                      Figure 2. Current ICS Assessment-Kupang District 
 
Figure4 and Figure 5 provide the information that out of five components, control environment was the most 
ineffective components in the current ICS implementation in both districts. The respondents perceived that the 
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control environment was implemented 50% lower that the expectation. The other two components which were also 
weak in the implementation were risk management and control activities which were around 60%. 
The following figures present more in-depth information of the determinant factors causing the three 
components were the worst implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 3. Determinants of Control Environment Assessment                          Figure 4. Determinants of Control Environment Assessment 
                                       -TTU District  -Kupang District 
 
Figure 3 and 4 depict that in both RGs, the worst implemented determinant in control environment, was 
commitment, followed by integrity and ethics, and conducive leadership variables. The respondents in both RGs 
contended that the tops’ commitment around 50% lower than 100% expectation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Figure 5. Determinants of Risk Management Assessment                             Figure 6. Determinants of Risk Management Assessment  
           -TTU District          -Kupang District 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Determinants of Control Activities Assessment -TTU District 
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Figure 8. Determinants of Control Activities Assessment -Kupang District 
 
Figure 5 and figure 6 conveys the information that at overall perception scoring around 50%, the respondents in 
both RGs perceived risk identification and analyses determinants were the worst implemented to control risk.  
Similarly, figure 7 and 8 show that at around 50% overall perception scoring on control activities, the respondents 
in both RGs determined that the utilizing of IS system, management performance and physical asset control were 
the worst implemented determinants in controlling the governance activities. 
Table 3 is briefly summarize the information of the issues arise because of weak ICS implementation. 
 
Table 3 Summarizing of the Findings 
Kupang District and TTU District 
The Most 
Ineffective Internal 
Control 
Components 
The Most 
Ineffective Items 
of the 
components 
Issues Arising Due to Lack of Internal Controls 
Accounting and Financial 
Issues 
Planning and Budgeting Issues Structure of ICS 
Control 
Environment 
Commitment  Poorly financial controlling 
system 
Poor planning and budgeting system 
implementation 
Poor ICS, resulting 
in Lack of effective 
staffing process to 
put right man at the 
right place and 
Lack of objective 
management 
performance  
Controlling 
Activities 
The utilizing of 
information 
system, 
Management 
Performance  
Lack of regular financial 
reconciliation, resulting in 
inaccuracy, incompleteness 
number reported, unreability 
and unaccountability 
Ineffective and poorly planning and 
executed budget system 
Ineffective reward 
and punishment 
Poor receipt and disbursement system Lack of Risk 
Management 
System, and even 
this is still 
perceived as 
something that is 
less important 
 Asset Control  Lack of asset protection policy, 
resulting asset misusing and 
asset missing 
Misuse of revenue and grants Lack of procedural 
control for several 
activities, include 
finance Lack of measurement and 
revaluation asset system, 
resulting in unreliable number 
of asset reported 
Lack of regular asset physical 
check process, resulting in 
asset misusing, missing and 
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misstated 
Risk Management  Risk 
Identification and 
Risk Analysis  
Lack of effective Risk financial 
Management application:  
Poor identification and analysing of 
planning and budgeting risks 
Lack of risk 
management 
system 
Information and 
Communication 
 Information Lack of Standard of Procedures 
in accounting information 
system and reporting 
Lack of Standard of Procedures in 
planning and budgeting system 
Lack of Standard of 
Procedures in 
accounting 
information system 
and reporting 
    Poor communication with internal and 
external parties regarding planning 
and budgeting 
Monitoring  Continuous 
Monitoring and 
Separated 
Function 
Lack of independency of 
internal control team with the 
government 
Poor continues monitoring as the 
absence of strategy planning 
monitoring 
Lack of 
independency of 
internal control 
team with the 
government 
Irregular physical asset 
reconciliation 
 
Table 3 indicates that all the issues are very crucial and interrelated issues which are actually very important in 
order to attain fiscal decentralization. For example, due to poor commitment of top officials to have effective 
financial controlling system had an impact on physical control activities, resulting in the absence of asset 
protection policy, revaluation asset system and regular physical check. The overall findings also revealed that RGs 
in two districts have poor ICS structure which lack of several important procedural controls such as financial 
control, planning and budgeting control, IS control, risk management control and performance based management 
control. 
 
3.2 Step two-assessing what factor causes top officials break commitment 
 
Table 4. The Result of Likert Scale in Conflict of Interest Aspects 
Variables Assessed Index Formula 
TTU 
Index Formula 
Kupang 
The impacts of the country's next local, state, or national election on the change 
of government or regional policy 66% 68% 
The effect of the most local political elites in representative power viewing 
government policies on regent governance policies 75% 74% 
The effect of the most likely local political elites' power viewing government 
budgeting, programs and activities 84% 72% 
The impact of change in government regulation, along with any planned 
changes to it, on regency governance 71% 72% 
The effect of budgeting timescale on proposed regency budgeting 75% 76% 
The impact of current economy stability on government budgeting 60% 62% 
The impact of staff salary on performance 74% 78% 
The impact of change in society's levels of health, education, and social 
mobility on staff or top official life style 64% 72% 
The effect of diversity on religion, beliefs, tribes, races and social groups on 
social attitudes in working place 75% 80% 
 
The interval for the scale is 100% divided by 5 levels of influence which is 20%. The description is 0%-19,99% 
is very low, 20%-39,99% is low, 40%-59,99 is neutral, 60%-79,99% is high and 80%-100% is very high. Table 4 
indicates that the TTU respondents assessed political conflict interest which is driven by the power of local elites, 
had very high effect on top officials to break their commitment. On the other hand, the Kupang respondents 
determined premodeliasm as the main reason breaking top officials’ commitment. Those variables are in the range 
of very high level of influence. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
4.1 Current ICS assessment 
 
The results (fig.1 and 2) contend that out of five components, control environment was the most ineffective 
component in ICS implementation in Kupang District and TTU District and it is mainly driven by lack of 
commitment (fig 3 and 4).  
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COSO states that all components are interrelated. This means, when commitment which is the critical 
determinant in control environment, is weak, it has a severe impact on the other control determinants and other 
components. To get more comprehensive explanation, this section is divided into three broaden control issues 
which are issues in finance and accounting system, planning and budgeting system and the structure of ICS (Table 
3). 
 
4.1.1 The control issues in finance and accounting system 
 
The issues that were found in both districts LGFRs 2009-2011, mainly related to inaccuracy in financial 
records, incompleteness of financial records, unreliability and unaccountability of financial reporting, delayed 
financial reporting, inadequate accounting information system, and incompetence human resources (SAA Audit 
report 2010-2012, LGFRs 2009-2011). One of the reasons those issues arose is because poor ICS due to lack of 
tops’ commitment to build strong financial control system.  
Poor commitment of having effective and efficient governance system (one of the critical variables of 
commitment-refer to table 1) by failing to establish well-built financial controlling system, automatically, resulting 
in poor financial control policies (control activities component), one of them is lack of physical asset control. 
Consequently, the financial risks were not comprehensively identified and analysed, leading to inaccuracy, 
incompleteness; unreliability and unaccountability of financial reports (refer to table 3). The situation was 
worsened by poor human resource again because of poor commitment of top officials to put the right man at the 
right place and developing effective information system (IS).  
Poor human resources and IS infrastructure was one of the reasons making harder for the tops to control the 
governance which definitely affected the other control variables. For instance, poor IS infrastructure caused very 
hard for the top officials to obtain information regarding ICS implementation in both districts. Actually, 
Accountability reports 2009-2011 of two RGs, provide the information that due to the lack of effective IS, the top 
officials find difficulties controlling the governance and determining government performance at lower levels. 
Therefore, in the accountability reports, which actually should report performance based on quality of government 
work, provide performance based on quantity of the work by comparing the budget and the realization numbers. 
They are not emphasized on the effectiveness of government programs implementation. This is the main reason of 
poor continuous monitoring which one of the critical ICS components. 
The diagnostic study of the World Bank (2003) has the same finding as these findings on how the tops at the 
local levels are unsuccessful to create an effective PFM because of poor financial controlling system which is the 
most important requirement to successfully establish fiscal decentralization. 
 
4.1.2 The control issues in planning and budgeting system 
 
The issues found were related to poor planning structure, poor receipt and disbursement mechanism, misused of 
local revenue and grants, disbursement outside the budget, improper budget policy causing loss of potential local 
revenue (SAA Audit Report 2010-2012). 
Those issues arose because of weak commitment of the top officials to strictly follow the existing planning and 
budgeting system. This produced more opportunities for budget manipulation. For instance, in both districts, they 
perform the bottom-up procedure for planning and budgeting process and every year, units plan budget based on 
their needs. However, in budget implementation, most executed items, were items that were not proposed by the 
units. SAA found there were disbursement items outside the proposed budget and this frequently occurs every year 
(SAA Audit Report 2010-2012, Annual Local Government Budgets, 2009-2011). Similar picture that revealed in 
TTU RG by EEC in 2012, was the manipulation budget in social disbursement by the regent to fund his political 
campaign in 2009 (EEC, 2012). Those persistent facts show that the lack of commitment of top official to strictly 
enforce existing planning and budgeting system was one of the reasons for both districts getting disclaimer (SAA 
Audit Report, 2010-2012). 
191 Moni Muskanan /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  164 ( 2014 )  180 – 193 
 
 
 
Those findings fit with the Deva’s argument (2005) that in fact, in developing countries typical controlling 
issues faced are at planning and budgeting system in which budget items are more reflecting the interests of certain 
local elites or tops’ needs by capturing relevant budget either to fund other private activities or for personal gain.  
 
4.1.3 The control issues in ICS structure  
 
The issues revealed were related to the absence of formal standards of procedure for each government activity, 
ineffective implementation of standard of procedure, poor continuous monitoring performance of top officials and 
audit settlement of internal auditor (SAA Audit report 2010-2012). This occurred due to the absence of top 
officials’ commitment to manage the activities effectively and efficiently (table 1). Hence, only a few standard of 
control procedures were established (poor control activities), creating high risks for manipulation (poor risk 
management) and definitely this showed poor performance of continuous monitoring who the main supervisor is 
the top official itself.  
For instance, in Kupang RG, many staffs were placed based on emotional attachment with the tops, rather than 
based on their skills and experiences due to the lack a formal standard procedure of staff placement. This situation 
was worsened by lack of based performance management (fig.7 and 8). This picture depicts how top officials may 
difficult to implement continuous monitoring effectively because of the lack of procedural control on staff 
placement (table 3). 
According to GR number 60 in 2008, the important requirement to establish effective ICS structure is the tops 
have to have commitment to set up effective ICS structure for example applying control procedure on each 
government activity, otherwise control issues might be higher. For example, during 2009-2011, almost the same 
critical recommendations were suggested by the internal and external, but the same control issues were still faced, 
showing in disclaimer opinion on two districts’ LGFRs. This constantly takes place because of lack of 
commitment of the top officials, who is the main controllers in the ICS structure, to improve the control structure 
by applying procedural control each government activity by effectively implementing standard of procedure and 
continuously monitoring performance and audit settlement of internal auditor. 
Based on the evaluation above, it can be derived that the main problems contributing to number of control 
issues in Kupang District and TTU District, relate to the failure of top ranking officials to implement effective 
control environment because of poor commitment. This can be seen in the absence of some procedural control in 
financial activities, planning and budgeting system, some critical governmental activities, risk management 
system, management based performance, and information system. This finding also depicts how the top officials 
failed to show their commitment to manage the activities effectively and efficiently as one of the critical variable 
in commitment determinant. 
 
4.2 Step two-determining the reason why top officials break their commitment 
 
Step one shows how the top officials cannot enforce to implement effective ICS by enforcing their commitment 
to strictly establish some procedural control in finance, planning and budgeting, risk management and performance 
management which significantly creates more opportunities for manipulation.  
The more awful picture as the absence of tops’ commitment is the top officials were involved with some 
manipulation and corruption cases. This is highly likely to occur because in fiscal decentralization practices, there 
are more resources are transferred to local levels from the Centre and top officials have more role to decide how 
those resources are used. To some extends this situation persuades top officials to engage with “conflict of 
interest”, leading to breaking their commitment to create effective ICS, showing in the absence of some important 
procedural control to manage FD. This definitely provides more opportunities for rampant corruption (Manor, 
1999).  
It is argued that conflict of interest significantly triggers the top officials breaking their commitment to manage 
government activities effectively and efficiently. The respondents from two districts were given nine variables of 
the three aspects to be assessed which variable has the highest effect on top officials breaking their commitment 
.The variables assessed are depicted in Table 4.  
TTU respondents determined that variable 3, the effect of the most likely local political elites' power viewing 
government budgeting, programs and activities, had the highest impact on top officials breaking their commitment 
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which the score is 84%. This is very likely to take place in planning and budgeting process when several budget 
items are manipulated because of political conflict of interest. For instance, the regent of TTU who is also one of 
the local political elites broke his commitment to manipulate Social Expenditure for political campaign party in 
2009 (EEC-2012). 
This finding shows an agreement with the Devas’s finding (2005) that above picture typically occurs in the 
fiscal decentralization implementation in developing countries by which top officials tend to serve national and 
local politicians’ interests by compromising citizens’ needs into political elites’ needs. This is not mainly driven by 
top officials political interests, but more to political party’s interest where the top official is one of its politicians.  
It is obvious from the explanation that to some extends due to political pressures or political interest; the 
officials tend to break their commitment, compromising their integrity, loyalty and ethical values to meet their 
political interests or political elites’ interests. 
On the other hand, Kupang respondents perceived variable 9, the effect of diversity on religion, beliefs, tribes, 
races and social groups on social attitudes in working place, had the highest effect on top official breaking their 
commitment. The overall score is 80% which means this variable had a very high impact. Indeed, this research 
discovered that premodealism, a perceived need to surrender certain powers to one person who has an authority, as 
a way of holding their ethnically fragmented nation needs together, had a very powerful effect on social attitudes 
in working places. In fact, people from the same tribe tend to group themselves as they think they have the same 
needs. The problem is the dominated staffing group at top-down level is the regent’s group coming from Timorese 
tribe. Premodeliasm became a critical informal determinant to promote an official to get higher official position 
and not based on qualification. This caused a chaotic situation during the three years when almost all official 
position is fulfilled by the informal determinant rather than a formal professional approach which is more based on 
skills and experiences. The regent argued that there is abundant of official training that can be followed by the 
officials to enhance their skills. This, however, may lead to increase training cost that should be reduced as stated 
at regent’s cost strategy 2009-2013 (Kupang Regency Strategic Plan-2009-2013). 
The fact above shows how social conflict of interest affected top officials breaking their commitment to put the 
right person at the right place and manage the activities efficiently (Table 1). This, automatically, resulted in 
negative organization culture such as resentment among the staff and created opposite groups who feel they have 
the same negative treatment by the officials. Subsequently, this situation will cause negative working performance. 
This finding is line with Richard and Goodman finding that it is highly likely that premodealism can take place 
in the area with higher diversity. Kupang regency is very diverse composed of several tribes and customs. In 
addition, Richard argues that diversity can cause premodealism as people from the same tribe or custom create a 
group that may perceive the same social need to surrender certain powers to one person who comes from their 
group and has an authority to fight their group needs. This is seen as a way of holding their ethnically fragmented 
power more than others. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The overall assessment shows that ICS implementation in RGs of Kupang District and TTU District during 
2009-2011, was very poor due to the lack of effective control environment which is mainly driven by poor 
commitment from the top officials to manage the governmental activities effectively and efficiently. This leads to 
severe impacts on the other control components as can be perceived at the lack of critical procedural control in 
finance, planning and budgeting process, risk management, information system and performance based 
management. 
Further research reveals that conflict of interest was the main reason of top officials breaking their 
commitment. In fact, in TTU RG, political conflict of interest by serving a particular political party’s needs 
triggered the top officials breaking their commitment. On the other hand, in Kupang RG, social conflict of interest 
by serving a particular group of ethnic needs-premodealism, had the highest effect on the tops breaking their 
commitment.  
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Based on the findings, it is suggested that to improve future ICS implementation, the top officials need to show 
their commitment by reducing typical conflict of interests in order to strengthen control environment and develop 
particular procedural control needed. 
Future research is still needed involving constructing a control model formally and informally that relatively 
can be implemented in two districts that have particular political and social characteristics.  
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